THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING DEFENDANT:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Imagine an injurer harms a victim. If the injurer is solvent and
the victim can hale her into court, the victim may receive compensation
for damages. If the injurer is insolvent, or it is too costly for the victim
to bring an action against the injurer, then from the perspective of the
victim, the injurer has disappeared-the victim will receive no
compensation.
The effect of an injurer's potential disappearance on her incentive
to take care to avoid accidents is more subtle. One might think that the
more a potential injurer believes that future liability will be avoided,
the less care she would take to avoid accidents. A close analysis, however, reveals that the amount of care an injurer will take depends critically on whether she faces a negligence or strict liability rule and what
kind of scheme the courts devise for spreading the risk of the injurer's
disappearance among other potential injurers.'
This Comment employs an economic analysis of the problem of
the disappearing defendant. The analysis evaluates the relative efficiency2 of a number of liability rules governing a variety of different
types of accidents assuming that a potential injurer realizes that the
victim may never recover damages. The analysis is useful in providing
a framework for evaluating the courts's and commentators' 4 attempts to
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
One liability rule is relatively more efficient than another if it is Pareto-superior, i.e., under some circumstances it provides better incentives for potential tortfeasors
to take efficient amounts of care, see infra note 18 and accompanying text, and it never
provides worse incentives.
3 See, e.g., Moody v. Kirkpatrick, 234 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1964); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1978); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957);
Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 67, 618 P.2d 1230, 1231 (1980).
4 Commentators' discussions are limited to cases involving multiple tortfeasors
where one of the tortfeasors becomes insolvent or is absent. See Myse, The Problem of
the Insolvent Contributor,60 MARQ. L. REv. 891 (1977); Note, 12 RuTrGERs L. REv.
533, 537-38 (1958) (discussing Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.J. 17, 134
I
'

A.2d 761 (1957)); see also UNiF. CoNTRiBUTioNs AMONG TORTFFASoRs AcT § 2

commissioner's comment, 12 U.L.A. 88 (1975) ("it is not only difficult but unwise to
try to state an express rule dealing with all the equitable situations which may arise");
REsATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 886A comment c (1979) ("when there are three
tortfeasors and one of them is clearly insolvent or is beyond the jurisdiction, the amount
of contribution fairly allowable between the other two may reasonably be affected and
the court may be expected to do what is fair and equitable under the circumstances");
Rizzo & Arnold, CausalApportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1399, 1422 (1980). In comparative fault jurisdictions, see UNIF.
(145)
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grapple with the problem of the disappearing defendant and in highlighting a consideration that has not yet received a systematic treatment
in the economics-of-law literature.' The Comment details some rather
striking differences between a negligence and a strict liability rule, and
concludes that the former is more efficient.
The reader should be cautious in interpreting the conclusions of
the Comment. First, the analysis relies on a number of controversial
assumptions, the validity of which may depend upon the nature of accidents and potential injurers. For example, it is assumed that a potential
injurer decides how much care to take to avoid accidents depending
upon the injurer's assessment of her likelihood of insolvency or absence
from a lawsuit. Obviously that assumption is more likely to be accurate
of corporate decisions on product and worker safety than of individuals'
decisions on how much care to take when crossing the street. Second,
although the analysis compares the relative efficiency of the negligence
rule to that of the strict liability rule, it should not be interpreted as
providing a comprehensive comparison of the effects and desirability of
negligence and strict liability rules. Instead, the Comment focuses on
the more narrow question of how alternative liability rules affect potential injurers' incentives to take care in the face of a likelihood of
disappearance.
Part I of the Comment briefly describes the problem of the disappearing defendant and the legal rules used to allocate the risk of an
injurer's insolvency or absence among the victim and other tortfeasors,
if any. Part II presents an economic analysis of single defendant acciCOMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1983) ("the court... shall
reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at
fault, according to their respective percentages at fault"); Fleming, Report to the Joint
Committee of the CaliforniaLegislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated
with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465,
1491-94 (1979).
1 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-61 (2d ed. 1977);
Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517 (1980); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1980); Golding, Economic Efficiency of Liability Rules for Joint Torts with Uncertainty 2 (1982) (Federal Trade Comm'n Working Paper No. 67).
In a forthcoming article, Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation of Safety,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1984), Shavell contends that where potential injurers
might be incapable of paying for the full amount of harm that they cause or where
potential injurers might not face the threat of suit for the harm they cause, it is preferable to regulate these injuries through the use of liability rules. This Comment complements Shavell's analysis by showing how negligence and strict liability rules fail to
encourage efficient precautionary behavior. The analysis in the Comment, however,
indicates that the choice of liability rules-strict liability versus negligence and recovery
versus simple-affects the extent to which potentially insolvent or absent injurers will
take inefficiently low levels of care.
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dents and concludes that a negligence rule induces more efficient behavior than a strict liability rule. Part III presents an economic analysis of
accidents involving joint tortfeasors and argues that a negligence liability rule combined with a rule that places the risk of one tortfeasor's
disappearance on the other joint tortfeasors and not on the victim is
most efficient. Part IV suggests applications of the analysis to problems
raised by the market share liability theory and by manufacturers' ability to file for reorganization in response to substantial potential tort
liabilities. A Technical Appendix is included for those with formal
training in economics.
I.

Ex Post AND Ex Ante VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM

Judges and commentators have focused on how to allocate a
"missing" tortfeasor's liabilities among the victim and other tortfeasors.' That approach is explicitly ex post because it assumes that an
accident has occurred and that a tortfeasor is missing. Discussions of
the relative merits of distributing the risk of insolvency or absence are,
therefore, limited to debates over the fairness of ensuring a victim's
compensation for injuries versus the fairness of requiring an injurer to
pay for more than that injurer would have had to pay but for another
tortfeasor's insolvency or absence.
An ex ante view of the problem, on the other hand, enables us to
ask how the liabilities of an insolvent or absent injurer should be apportioned to ensure that a potentially insolvent or absent injurer takes
an appropriate amount of precaution to avoid accidents. This ex ante
view thus permits us to focus attention on the deterrent effects of a
variety of possible legal rules. The first section of this part presents the
ex post view of the problem and summarizes the courts' solutions. The
7
second section describes the ex ante view in more detail.
A.

The Ex Post View

If one injurer harms a victim, and the injurer "disappears" by the
time of the victim's suit, the victim is not compensated. From the ex
post perspective the law appears to have no way of helping victims
avoid bearing the risk of an injurer's insolvency. When there are a
number of injurers, however, and one disappears, there are alternative
rules for providing compensation for the victim. This Comment will
discuss two such rules: the "simple rule" and the "recovery rule."
' See supra notes 3-4.
7 See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 520.
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Under the simple rule, each injurer pays only for the share of the damages she caused and the victim goes uncompensated for the portion of
the damages attributable to the insolvent or absent injurer.8 In effect,
the risk of an injurer's disappearance is on the victim, just as in the
single injurer case. Under the recovery rule, each injurer pays for her
share of damages plus a portion of the damages attributable to the insolvent or absent injurer. Thus, the risk of disappearance is placed on
the other tortfeasors and the victim is fully compensated. 9
An example illustrates the difference between those two rules.
Suppose that three injurers, A, B, and C harmed a victim D and that C
went insolvent between the time of the victim's injury and the time of
her suit against A and B. Suppose also that a court found A, B, and C
equally liable for the victim's $100,000 injury. Under the simple rule,
the victim would partially recover and collect $66,666 (A and B would
each pay $33,333) while under the recovery rule the victim would fully
recover (A and B each pay $50,000). This brief review indicates that if
" Id. at 529.
" The "recovery rule" and the "simple rule" are terms this Comment will use to
refer to the effect of joint tortfeasors being found "jointly and severally liable" or "individually liable," respectively. Joint and several liability is imposed if injurers act in
concert to commit a tort, fail to perform a common duty, were in a respondeatsuperior
relationship, or were independent actors engaged in separate negligent acts that concurred to produce a single, indivisible injury to the victim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875-879 (1979); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
692-95 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 314-17 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Recent
Developments in Joint & Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319-25 (1973). If
joint and several liability is imposed, an insolvent or absent injurer's liability must fall
on a solvent defendant, because any of the solvent injurers may be held liable for all of
the victim's damages. If joint and several liability is imposed and there is a right to
contribution, the risk of an injurer's insolvency will either be borne by the injurer who
was held fully liable and is seeking contribution from the other joint tortfeasors or will
be shared among all the solvent tortfeasors. The general rule, following contribution in
contract law, is that the risk of insolvency is spread among all the solvent tortfeasors
and does not lie with the named tortfeasor. See, e.g., Tucker v. Nicholson, 12 Cal. 2d
427, 433-34, 84 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1938); Lormier v. Julius Knack Coal Co., 246 Mich.
214, 218-19, 224 N.W. 362, 364 (1929); Wilson v. Crutcher, 176 Okla. 481, 481, 56
P.2d 416, 417 (1936); Cranston v. Ingle, 123 Or. 280, 285, 261 P. 55, 57 (1927);
Cranston v. Stanfield, 123 Or. 314, 325, 261 P. 52, 55 (1927); Maresh v. Jennings, 38
S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Appleford v. Snake River Mining, Milling &
Smelting Co., 122 Wash. 11, 210 P. 26, 28 (1922).
Joint and several liability is not imposed if the multiple tortfeasors' independent
activities concur to produce a divisible injury to the victim which is capable of apportionment. When the injury is found divisible, each injurer is held individually liable
only for a share of the victim's damages equal to the extent to which she contributed to
the victim's injuries. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 881 (1979); W. PROSSER,
supra, § 52. What constitutes a divisible or an indivisible injury, however, is unclear,
although it appears that injuries produced by nuisances are often considered divisible.
See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, at 706-09; W. PROSSER, supra, §§ 52, 94.
A discussion of contributory negligence and comparative fault is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For such a discussion, see Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 537-39.
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only one injurer harms the victim, and that injurer disappears, the law
places the risk of the injurer's disappearance on the victim. If more
than one injurer harms the victim, the court may follow either liability
rule.1 °
B.

The Ex Ante View

An ex ante perspective permits us to consider how the risk of a
tortfeasor's disappearance should be distributed to provide the correct
incentives for potential injurers to take the appropriate amount of care
to avoid accidents. It relies heavily on two insights: first, injurers, be
they individuals or firms, always have an expected likelihood of insolvency or absence, and second, those expected likelihoods may vary
across different injurers and time. The importance of these observations
will be made clear in parts II and III of the Comment.
Three main factors determine an injurer's likelihood of disappearance. First, and rather obviously, the more likely it is that she will go
bankrupt, the more likely it is that she will not be held fully liable for
the injuries she causes. The likelihood of an individual's or firm's bankruptcy depends on a variety of factors. For example, the overall state of
the economy affects the likelihood of bankruptcy. During periods of
growth in the economy, the likelihood of a business failure is lower
than during periods of recession or depression. In addition, the degree
to which a firm's managers operate the firm in an inefficient way affects the firm's ability to compete with other firms. The less efficient
the firm, the greater the firm's likelihood of bankruptcy. Also, the degree to which a firm sells a number of different product lines affects its
likelihood of insolvency. If a firm sells a number of different products
and the demand for one of those products declines, the firm may stay
solvent because it has other product lines. If, however, the firm sells
only one product and demand falls for that product, the firm may go
insolvent.1 1 Finally, other factors, such as a corporation's capitalization,
10 Courts and legislatures have, to a limited extent, adopted rules that may be

viewed as attempts to ensure that victims will not go uncompensated because of an
injurer's insolvency or absence. Such ex ante attempts include compulsory insurance
and bond requirements, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1009.104 (Purdon 1983), as
well as rules permitting a court to pierce the corporate veil when a corporation is
significantly undercapitalized, see, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, Inc., 569 F.2d
1203, 1209 (3d Cir. 1977) (developer liable for failure to use solvent or adequately
insured subcontractor); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) ("The equitable owners of a corporation ... are personally liable ... when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate
in the conduct of corporate affairs.").
" See Williamson, The Modern Corporation:Origins,Evolution, Attributes, 19 J.
ECON. Lrr. 1537, 1558 n.35 (1981).
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the riskiness of the corporation's business strategy, and the burdens of
government regulation may also play a role.
Second, court procedural rules affect the likelihood that an injurer
may have to appear in court some day. The more expensive it is for a
victim to bring a suit against an injurer, the higher the injurer's likelihood of absence. For example, to the extent that venue rules permit
removal of a case to an injurer's home state and away from the victim's
home state, the victim is inconvenienced and may be less likely to bring
a suit, or more likely to settle for a smaller amount than she would
otherwise. Service of process restrictions may also discourage suits.
Third, the type of injury the injurer inflicts on the victim affects
the injurer's likelihood of disappearance. The longer the period between when the tort occurs and the time the victim discovers the injury,
the greater the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence. For example, assuming that the injurer has a given annual likelihood of insolvency, if the injurer exposes the victim to a chemical that gives the
victim cancer fifteen years later, the injurer will have a higher likelihood of insolvency at the time of the suit than if the chemical caused
cancer one year after exposure.
The factors affecting injurers' expected likelihood of insolvency or
absence indicate the ex ante perspective's second important insight: potential injurers face different likelihoods of insolvency or absence over
time, and, at any given time, some injurer's may have greater likelihoods of insolvency than others. That observation implies that at any
given time there is a distribution of injurers, some of whom have relatively large likelihoods of insolvency or absence and some of whom have
relatively small likelihoods, and that that distribution may change over
time.
The next two parts of the Comment present an economic analysis
of the problem of the insolvent or absent injurers. Part II analyzes single injurer accidents and shows that the choice of a negligence or strict
liability rule affects potential injurers' willingness to take care to avoid
injuring potential victims. It concludes that a negligence rule is relatively more efficient. Part III examines multiple injurer accidents and
analyzes the relative efficiency of the recovery and simple rules. That
part concludes that the recovery rule is relatively more efficient than
the simple rule.
II.

SINGLE INJURER ACCIDENTS

Imagine that in all accidents, one injurer harms one victim, and
the victim is passive, that is, the amount of care the victim takes to
avoid the accident does not affect the likelihood or severity of the vic-
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tim's injury. This admittedly highly stylized case is studied for two reasons. First, it may be descriptive of many types of accidents: for example, a water main bursts and floods the basement of a home; a plane
crashes into a house; or a surgeon performs the wrong procedure on an
anaesthetized patient.12 Second, this case is useful for introducing concepts that will be used to evaluate the relative efficiency of the recovery
and simple rules in part III.
Section A briefly describes the traditional economic analysis of
how much care injurers take to avoid accidents and how many accidents
are likely to occur. In Section B, the traditional economic analysis is
modified to incorporate the fact that injurers' expected likelihoods of
insolvency or absence affect their decisions about how much care to
take.

A.

TraditionalEconomic Analysis
1. Assumptions

A traditional economic analysis of negligence and strict liability
rules in the single injurer, passive victim case starts with a number of
assumptions, some of them controversial. 1" Since this Comment attempts to build on that analysis, only brief descriptions of those assumptions, which have been amply discussed in the literature,1 4 will be
given.
The first assumption is that injurers are risk neutral. 5 The second
assumption is that the cost to potential injurers of avoiding accidents
(the injurers' "care" costs) increases with the level of care they take,
and an additional unit of care is more expensive at a high level of care
Shavell, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
323 (1973); Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 366
(1974); Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1972); Shavell, supra note 5.
'1

I"

14

See supra note 13.

If an injurer is risk neutral, that means that she would not prefer a certain $50
over a 50-50 chance of winning $0 or $100. The assumption is somewhat controversial,
as there may be some reason to think that injurers are risk averse, i.e., they would
prefer the certainty of collecting $40 to the 50-50 chance of winning $100 or $0. See R.
LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 12-38 (1957).
The conclusions of this analysis do not change, however, if one assumes that injurers are risk averse. Risk aversion would imply that injurers would be more reluctant to
"bet" on their future insolvency, and therefore, all else equal, would take greater care
than was assumed in the analysis. Similarly, injurer risk aversion would increase an
injurer's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence, see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text, because she would be more reluctant to take less care and risk future
accidents.
15
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that at a low level. That is, there are increasing total and marginal
costs of accident avoidance."" The third assumption is that injurers' accident liabilities (the injurers' "expected accident costs") decrease as injurers take more care, and an additional unit of care at a low level of
care reduces expected accident costs by more than an additional unit at
a high level of care. 7 In other words, there are decreasing total and
marginal expected accident costs.
The fourth assumption is that the legal negligence due care standard is set at an economically efficient level."' If injurers take the "efficient" amount of care to avoid accidents the total social cost (care costs
plus expected accident costs) is lower than at any other level of care
they could take. 9 Since, by assumption, the negligence due care standard is set at an economically efficient level, an injurer that takes the
socially optimal level of care (the efficient level) will not be held liable
for any accidents; under the legal standard the injurer is not negligent
and the cost of any injury will be borne by the injured party.2 ° The
fifth assumption is that potential injurers are rational utility or profit
16 See Shavell, supra note 5, at 470.
17

See id.

A discussion of the reasonableness of this assumption in economic analysis is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For such a discussion see Cooter & Kornhauser,
Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help ofJudges, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139
(1980); Cooter, Kornhauser & Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information and the
Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366, 369-70 (1979). For evolutionary approaches,
see Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393 (1978); Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, "Why is the Common Law Efficient?" 6
J. LEGAL STD. 51 (1977); Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981). But see Cooter & Kornhauser, supra, criticizing
the evolutionary approach.
19 If a tortfeasor takes less than due care (the "efficient" amount of care, see supra
note 18 and accompanying text), then although care costs will be lower, expected accident costs will increase more than care costs will decrease and thus total social cost will
be greater than at an efficient negligence due care standard. Conversely, if a tortfeasor
takes more than due care, although expected accident costs will be lower, care costs will
increase more than expected accident costs will decrease and thus total social cost again
is greater than at an efficient negligence due care standard.
20 An example is illustrative. Table 1 contains a hypothetical example of an accident meeting assumptions 1-3. The data in this table, and successive tables, see infra
notes 46, 62, are hypothetical and were chosen to illustrate the assumptions and analysis of the Comment. The examples do not, of course, provide a proof of the analysis.
For such a proof, see the Technical Appendix.
Suppose that a chemical company has the option of installing five different types
of air filters, where each type of filter corresponds to a different level of care.
's
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maximizers.2 1
To sum up, the Comment assumes: (1) risk neutrality; (2) increasing total and marginal care costs; (3) decreasing total and marginal
expected accident costs; (4) a person is legally negligent if she takes less
than the efficient amount of care; and (5) rational utility or profit
maximization.
2.

Negligence Rule

The traditional economic analysis of the passive victim case reveals
that injurers will always take the efficient level of care and will never
be negligent.2 2 That does not mean that there will be no accidents, but
only that an efficient number of accidents will occur and that an efficient amount will be spent on avoiding them.2"
The reasoning for that conclusion is straightforward. Under a negligence rule, if the injurer takes "due care" she is not negligent and will
TABLE 1
Level of
Care
(filter type)

Care
Costs

Probability

Damage

P X D

Total
Costs

1
2

5
8

.023
.017

1000
1000

23
17

28
25

3
4
5

12
17
23

.012
.008
.005

1000
1000
1000

12
8
5

24
25
28

EXPECTED ACCIDENT COSTS

$

$

$

$

A thin, single-ply filter is inexpensive to make and install (type 1 filter care costs
equal $5), while a thick, multi-ply filter is expensive to manufacture and install (type 5
filter care costs equal $23) (assumption two). Note also that the marginal cost of installing the next safest filter is $3 ($8 - $5) if the company is deciding between type 1
and 2 filters, while the marginal cost of the next safest filter is $6 ($23 - $17) if the
company is deciding between type 4 and 5 filters (assumption two). Moreover, observe
that the thicker the filter, the less likely it is to fail and give chemical workers $1000
worth of respiratory damage (expected accident costs for type 1 filter equal $23 and for
type 2 filter equal $5) (assumption three). Also note that the marginal reduction in
expected accident costs of installing the next safest filter is $5 ($17 - $12) if the company is deciding between types 2 and 3 filters, while the marginal cost of the next safest
filter is $3 ($8 - $5) if the chemical company is deciding between type 4 and 5 filters
(assumption three). Finally, observe that it would be efficient for the chemical company
to install type 3 filters because the sum of care costs and expected accident costs are
lower ($24) than for any other level of care.
21 A person is rational if she always attempts to maximize her present discounted
value. In the case of corporate injurers, the fifth assumption implies there is no disparity of interests between those who control the corporation (management) and those who
own it (shareholders). A good discussion of that subject, with citations to much of the
literature, is found in F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 32-37 (2d ed. 1980).
" See sources cited supra note 5.
2 That is, total social costs will be minimized. See supra note 20.
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pay only care costs. The injurer will take no more than due care because to do so would needlessly increase her costs. She will not take less
care since she would then be liable and have to pay accident costs
(damages) as well as whatever care costs she had already paid.24 It is
important to highlight two aspects of this analysis. First, notice that by
taking at least due care, the injurer faces only care costs, while by taking less chre, the injurer pays those costs plus an expected damage liability. Second, if she takes less than due care, she must pay both current care costs and future expected damage costs.
3.

Strict Liability Rule

As was found under a negligence regime, the traditional economic
analysis of the passive victim case reveals that injurers will always
choose to take the efficient level of care under a strict liability rule. An
injurer under a strict liability rule is liable for the victim's injuries,
regardless of the care she takes. The injurer, therefore, will choose the
level of care that minimizes the sum of care costs and expected accident
costs. By definition, the sum is minimized at the efficient due care
level. 5
Two comparisons with the negligence rule should be noted. First,
unlike under the negligence standard, there is no sudden jump in the
amount of costs the injurer pays if she takes slightly less care than the
efficient or due care level of care. That is so because the injurer is
liable for the victim's injury under strict liability regardless of the
amount of care she takes, while she is liable for damages under the
negligence rule only if she takes less than due care. Second, as under
the negligence rule, the injurer faces total costs that are comprised of
current care costs and future expected damage costs. That is, the injurer's costs are the total social costs; since due care minimizes social
costs, the injurer takes due care. From an efficiency perspective the
negligence and strict liability rules result in injurers taking identical
" In the example, supra note 20, if the chemical company installed type 3, 4, or 5
filters it would be nonnegligent and face care costs of $12, $17, or $23. Clearly, of the
three alternatives, it would pick type 3, the due care standard. If the company decided
to install type I or 2 filters, it would face care costs of $8 or $5 and expected damage
costs of $17 or $23. Thus, the company would face total costs of $25 or $28. Between
those two alternatives, the firm would pick type 2 filters, because $25 is less than $28.
But will the company prefer installing type 2 filters to type 3 filters? Clearly not,
because its total liabilities equal $25 if it installs type 2 and $8 if it installs type 3
filters.
"5See supra note 20. For filters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the injurer faces care costs and
expected damage costs totalling $28, $25, and $28. The minimum of these costs occur
with filter 3-the efficient level of care.
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amounts of care to avoid accidents.26
B.

Economic Analysis of Potentially Insolvent
or Absent Injurers

Assuming that injurers have some expected likelihood of disappearance, they will not always take the efficient level of care under
either a negligence or strict liability rule. This Comment will show,
however, that the negligence liability rule is more efficient than the
strict liability rule because the former better ensures that the injurer
will take the efficient amount of care. Specifically, under a negligence
rule, injurers will take due care only if their likelihood of insolvency or
absence is less than a certain critical likelihood of insolvency or absence.
If the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than the.
critical level, then the injurer will take much less than due care.27 In
contrast, under a strict liability rule, an injurer will always take less
than efficient amounts of care as long as her expected likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than zero. Finally, an injurer takes the
same amount of care under a negligence rule as under a strict liability
rule if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency is greater than the critical
likelihood of insolvency. Importantly, in interpreting these conclusions
it should be recalled that they refer only to the relative efficiency of the
rules with respect to the problem of the potentially disappearing
injurer.
1. Assumptions
The analysis employs the same assumptions as before and adds
one additional assumption. We assume that injurers have information
about the likelihood of their disappearance and make judgments about
how much care to take after considering those likelihoods. There are
three reasons for thinking that assumption is reasonable. First, an injurer, in a time of financial crisis, may implicitly discount future liabilities while attempting to solve current financial woes. For example, if a
26 The difference between the two rules is, of course, who bears the cost of those
accidents it is not worth preventing, i.e., those that occur even with injurers taking
efficient, due care. Under a negligence regime, the victim bears the accident costs, while
under strict liability the injurer does.
2 With likelihoods of insolvency or absence greater than the "critical" likelihood,
injurers take less than due care; with likelihoods less than the critical level, injurers will
take due care. The critical level is a function of the "technology" of an accident: the
care costs and expected accident costs at every level of injurer care. Thus, the magnitude of an injurer's critical likelihood varies with the type of accidents that injurer may
cause. See infra note 32.
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creditor is demanding that the injurer pay back an old debt and the
injurer has little cash on hand, the injurer may cut back on the level of
care she takes in order to reduce her costs and raise the cash to repay
the debt. As an obvious example, a firm facing bankruptcy will not
invest in worker safety equipment to avoid tort claims in future years.
Therefore, potential injurers implicitly discount future liabilities and
2 8'
take less care whenever they are in financial difficulties.
Second, a firm's or individual's likelihood of bankruptcy is frequently evaluated by lenders and thus an injurer will have information
about her likelihood of bankruptcy. Lenders make judgments about the
riskiness of a loan to a firm or individual and charge a higher borrowing rate, the higher the firm's or individual's likelihood of insolvency.
For example, rating agencies scrutinize a company's financial statements and assess its financial strengths before assigning a rating to the
company's debt. 9 Given that an injurer can estimate her likelihood of
insolvency, it would be rational for the injurer to use that information
in deciding how much care to take because the injurer may increase the
present discounted value of her future profit stream by taking less care
and counting on a certain probability of disappearing.
Third, if an injurer could reduce costs by taking less care now
because she may be insolvent or able to take advantage of procedural
rules to discourage a lawsuit, it would be rational for an injurer to
learn about her future likelihood of insolvency or absence. A firm or
individual could do this in a variety of ways, including hiring lawyers
and consulting services.3 0
See supra note 21.
19 See, e.g., MOODY'S OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL v-vi (1983).
So Before turning to the anlaysis of the negligence and strict liability rule, it is
important to note that it is also assumed that the negligence standard of care set by the
court is not related to individuals' and firms' likelihoods of insolvency or absence. This
qualification to assumption three is warranted for three reasons. First, the explanations
of how courts learn of the efficient levels of care do not explain how the court would
learn about a firm's or individuals' likelihood of insolvency or absence. For example,
according to one explanation, courts set the due care standard from information provided by witnesses about the technology of accidents, not the financial position of the
firm, see, e.g., Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 18. Moreover, in the single defendant
case, courts only hear testimony from solvent defendants, who the courts (probably)
assume had a zero likelihood of insolvency or absence at the time of the accident. See
infra note 33 and accompanying text. Second, there is no evidence that courts consciously adjust the standard of care to reflect injurer's likelihoods of insolvency or absence. Third, it is not at all clear what a court would or should do if it learns what the
injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence was at the time of the accident. Increase
the standard of care? Decrease it? Our analysis, in fact, shows that it would be inefficient for a court to adjust the due care standard to account for injurers' likelihood of
insolvency or absence. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
28
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2.

Negligence Rule

An injurer will not necessarily take the efficient level of care
when, as assumed, the injurer bases her decisions as to the amount of
care to take on, among other things, her likelihood of disappearance. If
that likelihood exceeds some critical level, the injurer will take an inefficiently low level of care and thus cause an inefficiently large number
of accidents. At likelihoods of insolvency less than that critical level, the
injurer will take due care.
In deciding how much care to take, the injurer considers the care
costs she must pay now and the expected accident costs that she will
have to pay in the future if she is found liable. The conclusion that an
injurer's care is discontinuous-that is, the injurer takes reasonable
care until the probability of her insolvency or absence rises to a critical
level beyond which she will take inefficiently low levels of care-is a
result of the discontinuity in the expected costs that an injurer faces
under a negligence regime.
To see this conclusion dearly, it is useful to consider an injurer
with differing likelihoods of insolvency or absence. If the injurer knows
she will become insolvent or be absent from trial (her likelihood of insolvency, a, equals one) then the injurer knows she will never have to
pay any accident costs, since she will have disappeared. She must pay
only current care costs. In this .extreme case, then, the injurer would
take no care since that is cheaper than taking some care and she will
not have to pay for any of the accidents that result. On the other hand,
if the injurer knows she will not disappear (a equals zero) the injurer,
as the earlier analysis showed, 1 will take the efficient level of care.
For any a between zero and one the injurer makes the following
calculation: should I take due care and pay only care costs, or should I
take a lower level of care and pay less in care costs but also face the
possibility of future damage liabilities discounted by the likelihood that
I will disappear.
Note that if a were small and the injurer took slightly less than
due care, the injurer would pay current care costs plus future expected
accident liabilities discounted by a very small amount, i.e., a is almost
zero, so the odds of the injurer disappearing are so small that the injurer pays almost all the expected accident costs. Total costs would be
greater than those the injurer would pay if she took due care (was not
negligent) and paid only care costs. At some critical a (ac), however, a
would be large enough so that the expected future damages liability
SI

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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would be discounted enough that the cost of due care would be greater
than the sum of care costs and discounted expected accident costs. Beyond that critical ac, the injurer, therefore, would take significantly less
32

care.

That conclusion may be conceptualized as follows. At levels of care
greater than or equal to due care, the injurer pays only care costs. At
lower levels of care the expected accident costs "kick in," and the injurer must pay for them, too. Once those costs "kick in," it takes a
large amount of discounting, that is, the critical likelihood of insolvency
or absence must be great, in order to lower the expected accident costs
enough to make it worthwhile for the injurer to take less than due care.
The analysis not only shows that a negligence liability rule may
not be efficient, but also provides a justification for awarding punitive
damages when injurers are grossly negligent."3 Earlier it was pointed
out that even if a court knew what a defendant's likelihood of insolvency was at the time of the injury, it was not at all clear how a court
might use the information to determine an injurer's liability. If the
court simply raised the due care standard when it knew that a defendant's a was greater than zero, then the court might encourage an inefficient level of care. If the defendant's a were greater than zero but less
than ac and the court imposed a higher level of care than the efficient
level, the injurer would be forced to take an inefficiently high level of
32 See supra note 20. Recall that if filter 3 were installed, the chemical company
faced $12 of care costs and no expected future liabilities. This was the level of care the
company would choose because at any other level of care, it would face greater expected
total costs. Suppose, however, the company had an a = .1. If it installs filter 3 it faces
costs of $12.00, for filter 2, costs totalling $23.30 ($8 + (.017)(1000)(1 - .1)) and for
filter 1, costs totalling $25.70 (5 + (0.23)(1000(1 - .1)). Obviously, it would opt to
install filter 3. Suppose, however, that the company had an a = .7. If it installs filter 3
it still faces costs of $12. At the higher likelihood of disappearance, however, the expected future liabilities are greatly discounted. If filter 2 is installed, the company faces
costs of $13.10 ($8 + (0.17)(1000)(1 - .7)) and if filter 1 is installed, the company
faces costs of $11.90 (5 + (0.23)(1000)(1 - .7)). Therefore, it will be cheaper for the
company to install filter 1-not the efficient level of care.
To see that the company's level of care drops precipitously at some critical a,
suppose that the company's ai = .68-only two one-hundreths less than before. Now it
faces costs of $12 for filter 3, and $13.44 (8 + (0.17)(1000)(1 - .68)) for filter 1. At a
= .68, the company will pick filter 3, while at a = .7, the company will pick filter 1.
Observe that the critical value of a may be calculated from the example ($12 = 5 +
(1000)(.023)(1 - .a)) and equals approximately .696.
The example shoivs that if the likelihood of insolvency or absence is less than the
critical likelihood, then the due care standard is met (filter 3), while if the likelihood of
insolvency is just greater than the standard, the amount of care the injurer picks is
substantially less than the standard (filter 1). The example also reveals that the critical
likelihood of insolvency or absence is a function of the technology of the accident, i.e.,
the care and expected accident cost functions.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSER, supra note
10, at 9-14.
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care.
The court could, on the other hand, raise the victim's damages
when the injurer's a is greater than ac. While the court certainly could not
directly observe the injurer's a and ac, it could infer that if the injurer took
very little care it was because the injurer's risk of insolvency or absence
was greater than the critical risk of insolvency or absence. In such instances, the court should award punitive damages to the victim. The
threat of punitive damages where the injurer's a is greater than a c
might deter an injurer with a high risk of insolvency from taking less
than due care.-'
3.

Strict Liability Rule

Under a strict liability rule, an injurer with a likelihood of disappearance greater than zero always takes less than the efficient amount
of care. Moreover, as the injurer's likelihood of insolvency rises, the
injurer takes less and less care. There is no precipitous drop in the
injurer's level of care at some critical likelihood of insolvency.
The analysis is straightforward. The injurer is always liable for
the victim's injuries. Therefore, in deciding how much care to take, the
injurer evaluates the sum of care costs and expected accident costs discounted by the likelihood that she will be insolvent or absent, for every
level of care. If a equals zero, she will take the efficient amount of care,
as above.3 5 If a equals one, the injurer will take no care since she will
pay zero care costs and zero expected liabilities because she is certain
she will disappear. Finally, the injurer will take less and less care as a
increases between zero and one, because the injurer's expected total
costs do not suddenly rise at some level of care, as under the negligence
rule.36
4.

Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Rules

A comparison of the negligence and strict liability rules in light of
-, See supra note 20. Where a = .7 and a = .696, the injurer chose to install
filter I at an expected total cost of $11.90 instead of following the standard level of care
at a cost of $12. A court could encourage the injurer to take the standard level of care if
the injurer could have expected to face punitive damages of $20, (i.e., filter 1 total costs
of $12.04 (5 + .023(1000 + 20)(1 - .7)) versus $12 for filter 3).
3 Her likelihood of disappearance is zero, so the traditional analysis is applicable.
See iupra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20. If a equals 0, then the company installs filter 3 at cost $24
(12 + (0.12)(1000)). If, however, a equals .4, the company will install filter 2 at a
lower total cost of $18.20 (8 + (.017)(1000)(1 - .4)) and if a equals .7, the company
will install filter I at an even lower total cost of $11.90 (5 + (0.23)(1000)(1 - .7)).
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an injurer's risk of disappearance reveals that for any risk of insolvency
or absence, an injurer will take at least the same, and sometimes more
care under the negligence rule than under the strict liability rule. If the
injurer's likelihood of disappearance is less than the critical likelihood,
the injurer takes an efficient level of care under the negligence rule, and
takes an inefficiently low level of care under a strict liability rule. The
negligence rule is thus more efficient than the strict liability rule in
those cases. If the injurer's likelihood of insolvency is greater than the
critical likelihood, the injurer takes the same inefficiently low level of
care under either rule. The two rules are equally inefficient in those
cases. Overall, then, the negligence rule promotes a more efficient level
of care. 7
III.

MULTIPLE INJURER CASE

Imagine that all accidents involve two injurers and one victim.
Also suppose that the victims are passive. Examples of accidents fitting
this description include two air polluters whose pollution gives a victim
emphysema or two neighbors who share a common wall and must
maintain it to keep the wall from collapsing on a pedestrian.38 Section
A of this part briefly describes the traditional economic analysis of how
much care joint injurers will take to avoid accidents and how many
accidents are likely to occur under a negligence rule. The section then
shows how the results differ if the analysis takes into account injurers'
likelihoods of disappearance and analyzes the effects of the recovery
and simple rules. Section B analyzes the multiple injury case under a
strict liability rule and follows the same organization as section A.
A.

Negligence Rule

1. Traditional Economic Analysis
a. Assumptions
Landes and Posner, in a recent article,3 9 analyze a variety of situations where more than one actor contributes to a victim's injury. They
identify a number of different types of joint torts including the "simultaneous joint care"'40 case. A joint tort is "simultaneous" if the tortious
acts occur at the same time or there is only one tortious act with uncer87 The reader is reminded that the relative efficiency of the negligence rule is
limited to its effect in dealing with the problem of the disappearing defendant.
s See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 518.
'9 Landes & Posner, supra note 5.
40 Id. at 517-18.
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tainty as to which of two injurers is responsible. A joint tort is a "joint
care" case if optimal accident avoidance requires both parties to take
care.4 In the example of the two polluters, the joint tort is simultaneous because the pollution from both polluters harms the victim. It requires joint care to avoid because, we shall assume, the sum of care and
expected accident costs is lower if both polluters take some care than if
only one does. Thus, it is cheaper for each of two equal polluters to
reduce their pollution by 50% than for one of them to reduce her pollution by 100%. That is so because we assume that an injurer's marginal
cost of pollution reduction increases with the level of care she takes to
reduce pollution.
Landes and Posner also make the assumptions that were used in
the single injurer case and further assume that the costs of the joint
tortfeasors voluntarily negotiating levels of care are prohibitive.4 2 That
assumption means that the injurers will not contract with each other to
control each other's decision to take care. This Comment will make the
same assumptions.
b. Analysis
Landes and Posner show that if courts set the negligence standard
at the efficent level of care, joint tortfeasors will take that level of
care.' They explain that as follows.
Joint tortfeasors A and B face a more complicated set of expected
accident costs than in the single injurer case. If A takes due care then A
pays only care costs, whether or not B takes due care. If A takes less
than due care and B takes due care, A pays care costs at her level of
care and is liable for all of the victim's injuries. Finally, if A takes less
than due care and B takes less than due care, then A and B share the
victim's damages, plus pay for whatever care they did take. B, of
course, is subject to the same rules.
To show that A and B will take due care, Landes and Posner
show: (i) if B takes due care then A will as well; and (ii) if B does not,
A will still prefer to take due care. If B takes due care, then A pays
either the cost of due care or care costs at a lower level of care plus all
of the victim's expected accident costs. Because due care is the efficient
level of care, A's due care costs must be less than the sum of A's care
and expected accident costs at a level of care less than due care. 4 A will

43

Id. at 518.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522-26.

44

A will not be negligent and so will not pay any accident costs.

41

42
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thus follow the due care standard. Suppose, however, for whatever reason, A thinks that B will'take less than due care. If A also takes less
than due care, she pays lower care costs, but also pays a share of the
expected accident costs. What will A do?'A will still have an incentive
to take due care. The proof is by contradiction. If A and B both took
less than due care, that would imply that the sum of the care costs and
the expected accident costs at those levels of care were less than the sum
of those costs at due care standards. 45 But that, by definition, is not
possible because the due care standards were set at a level that minimizes the sum of care and expected accident costs.46
45

Assuming, see supra note 21, that A and B act rationally to maximize their

welfare.

48 An example may help make the proof clearer. Suppose that the two polluters, A
and B, choose levels of care x and y, respectively, where x and y equal 1 through 5.
Table 2 shows the care costs for every level of care for A and B.
TABLE 2
CARE COSTS ($)

Level of Care

A

B

2
3
4
5

4
9
16
25

8
27
64
125

x,X)1
yy1

1

(Note: A = x2; B = y3)
Table 3 shows the expected accident costs for all of the combinations of care that
A and B may take. The table reports the product of the probabilities and damages, i.e.,
the expected accident costs, for every combination of x and y. For example, if A takes 3
units of care and B takes 4 units of care, the expected accident costs equal $16.60. The
figures in the table conform to our earlier assumptions that at higher levels of care, for
either A or B, expected accident costs decline, at a declining rate.
TABLE 3
TOTAL EXPECTED ACCIDENT COSTS

($)
A's level
of care, x

B's level
of care, y

1
2
3
1
200.00
100.00
66.67
2
100.00
50.00
33.33
3
66.67
33.33
22.22
4
50.00
25.00
16.67
5
40.00
20.00
13.33
Note: Expected Accident Costs = 200
xy

4
50.00
25.00
16.67
12.50
10.00

5
40.00
20.00
13.33
10.00
8.00

Table 4 displays the sum of the care costs and expected accident costs at every
level of care. These totals were derived directly from Tables 2 and 3. For example, if A
takes 3 units of care and B takes 4 units of care, their care costs are $9 and $64 and the
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expected accident costs equal $16.60. In table 4, with A at 3 and B at 4, the total is
$89.60.
,TABLE 4
TOTAL SOCIAL COSTS

Sum of Care Costs + Expected Accident Costs

(S)

A's level
of care, x
2
105.00
62.00
64.33
93.00
149.00

5
4
3
1
66.00
67.00
76.67
202.00
1
53.00
49.00*
50.33
109.00
2
65.33
59.67
58.22
94.67
3
B's level
99.00
92.50
89.67
115.00
4
of care, y
158.00
151.00
147.33
166.00
5
* Minimum cost.
(Source: Tables 1 and 2).
Since the due care standards are set equal to the efficient levels of care, the levels
of care associated with the lowest total costs are the standards of care for A and B.
Inspection of table 4 reveals that the cost minimizing levels of care are when A takes 4
units of care and B takes 2 units of care. Therefore, x equals 4 and y equals 2 are the
efficient due care levels.
Tables 5 and 6 display the costs that A and B face under a negligence rule. It is
assumed, for ease of exposition, that if both A and B are liable each pay one-half of the
victim's injuries. This assumption does not affect the analysis. Tables 5 and 6 should be
read in the same way as the others. Tables 5 and 6 show that if A takes 4 units of care
and B takes 1 unit of care, A faces costs of $16.00 (table 5) and B faces costs of $51.00
(table 6). Note that at these levels of care B's costs are much greater than A's because B
is negligent and A is not.
TABLE 5
TOTAL CosTs TO

A

UNDER NEGLIGENCE RuLE

(s)

A's level
of care, x

B's level
of care, y

1
101.00
1
101.00
2
67.67
3
51.00
4
41.00
5
* Minimum cost.
(Source: Tables 2 and

A nonnegligent if x equal to
or greater than 4
A and B negligent if x less than
4 and y less than 2
A negligent, B nonnegligent
if x less than 4 and
y greater than or equal to 2

2
54.00
54.00
37.33
29.00
24.00

3
42.33
42.33
31.22
25.70
22.33

4
16.00*
16.00*
16.00*
16.00*
16.00*

5
25.00
25.00
25.00
25.00
25.00

3).
Care Costs
Expected Accident
Care Costs +
Costs
Care Costs + Expected Accident Costs

164

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 132:145

Economic Analysis of Potentially Insolvent
or Absent Injurers

The Landes and Posner proof must be extended once one considers that injurers make decisions incorporating an expected likelihood of
insolvency or absence.47 In general, it can be shown that if A (or B) has
a great enough likelihood of disappearance, then A may exercise less
than due care, and then so may B. Thus, contrary to Landes and Posner's conclusion, injurers may not take efficient levels of care. The
analysis also reveals that given that the negligence rule does not guarantee efficient levels of care, the recovery rule better promotes efficiency
than the simple rule.
TABLE 6
TOTAL COSTS TO

B

UNDER NEGLIGENCE RULE

($)

A's level
of care, x

B's level
of care, y

1
2
3
4
5

1
101.00
8.00*
27.00
64.00
125.00

2
51.00
8.00*
27.00
64.00
125.00

3
34.33
8.00*
27.00
64.00
125.00

4
51.00
8.00*
27.00
64.00
125.00

5
41.00
8.00*
27.00
64.00
125.00

* Minimum cost.
(Source: Tables 2 and 3).

B nonnegligent is y equal to or

Care Costs

greater than 2

B and A negligent if y less than
2 and x less than 4

B negligent, and A nonnegligent

Care Costs + 1h Expected Accident
Costs
Care Costs + Expected Accident Costs

if y less than 2 and
x greater than or equal to 4
The proof of Landes and Posner's proposition is clear from tables 5 and 6. The
due care standards are x equals 4 and y equals 2, and these are the cost minimizing
levels of care for both A and B. Turn first to table 5. A is clearly best off taking 4 units
of care, as she faces only $16.00 worth of costs. From table 6, it is clear that B is best
off taking 2 units of care as she faces only $8.00 in costs. Note that if A takes 4 units
and B takes 2 units of care, both are as well off as they could be taking any other level
of care. Thus, A and B will take 4 and 2 units of care, respectively, the due care
standard.
47 Landes and Posner acknowledge that the proof will not work "where one of the
injurers will not take care to avoid the accident, with the result that others may not
either," Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 542, but do not suggest that this may come
about from an injurer's expected likelihood of insolvency or absence.
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a. Assumptions
The analysis starts with the same assumptions as the traditional
analysis-the accident fits the simultaneous joint care case4 ' and it is
prohibitively expensive for the injurers to negotiate about the levels of
care they take-and also assumes that the injurers know and base their
decisions on how much care to take on their likelihood of insolvency or
absence.
To determine whether the recovery or simple rule is more efficient, we also assume that an injurer has some information about her
potential co-tortfeasor's likelihood of disappearance. We need not assume that a potential joint tortfeasor has perfect or average information
about her potential co-tortfeasor's likelihood of insolvency or absence,
but only that she thinks that her potential co-tortfeasor has a likelihood
of insolvency or absence greater than zero.
b. Analysis
Joint tortfeasors A and B face a more complicated set of possible
expected costs. As before, 49 if A takes due care, she pays only care costs,
regardless of how much care B takes. If A takes less than due care and
B takes due care, then A pays current care costs at her lower level of
care and all of the expected damage liabilities discounted by A's likelihood of disappearance. If A takes less than due care and B also takes
less than due care, then A and B both pay current care costs plus their
shares of discounted expected damage liabilities.
Importantly, in this last case, the choice of either the simple or
recovery rule affects the amounts by which the expected damage liabilities are calculated. Under the simple rule, A would pay current care
costs and her share of the expected future liabilities discounted by her
likelihood of insolvency. Under the recovery rule, however, A pays the
same care costs and share of expected liabilities, but the expected liabilities are discounted by a lesser amount. That is because if A remains
solvent and B becomes insolvent or is absent, A has to pay B's share of
the damages. Thus, under the recovery rule, A's expected liabilities increase as B's likelihood of disappearance increases, and are always
more than under the simple rule, where A never pays more than her
share of damages.50
48

See supra note 40.

49 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.

"0See note 46. From tables 2, 3, and 5 we know that when A takes 2 units of care
and B takes 1 unit of care, both are acting negligently. A faces care costs of $4 and her
one-half share of the expected liabilities of $50, for a total of $54. Suppose a equals .4
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Consider the Landes and Posner proof under the simple rule. The
proof relied on the proposition that if B takes less than due care, A will
still take due care because the sum of A's care costs and her share of
the victim's expected accident costs if A were negligent would be
greater than A's cost of due care. 5 1 Our earlier analysis of the single
injurer case, however, indicates that if A's likelihood of insolvency or
absence is great enough, A will not take due care.5 2 The proof also
relied on the proposition that if B takes due care, A will also, because
the sum of A's care costs and A's share of the accident costs if A were
negligent would be greater than A's cost of due care. 53 That proposition
is also false because at some likelihood of insolvency or absence A
would be better off taking less than due care. 54 Therefore, under the
simple rule, if one of the tortfeasors' risk of disappearance is great
enough, a negligence rule does not guarantee that the injurers will take
efficient, due care.
c.

Recovery and Simple Rules Compared

The recovery rule is relatively more efficient than the simple rule
because, all else equal, an injurer's critical likelihood of insolvency or
absence is greater under the recovery rule than under the simple rule.
Recall that there is no difference between the two rules if both A and B
take due care or if one does and the other does not.55 That is readily
apparent because in those two instances, at most one injurer is liable.
The choice of rules, under a negligence regime, affects the injurers'
behavior only when there is a possibility that both may be liable. That
leads us to reconsider the second part of the proof-if B takes less than
and B's likelihood of insolvency or absence, P, equals .2. Under the simple rule, A faces
care costs of $4 plus expected liabilities of $30 (( )(100)(1 - .4)) or $34. Under the
recovery rule, A faces the same $4 in care costs plus greater future expected liabilities
of $40 ((100)(%)(1 - .4) + (100)( )(.2)). Also, note that if 6 increases to .3, A's total
costs remain the same under the simple rule, but increase under the recovery rule to
$49 (4 + (100)(1)(1 - .4 + .3).
51 See supra note 46.
52 In the same example at supra note 46, from tables 2, 3, and 5 we know that
when A takes 3 units of care and B takes 2 units of care, A faces care costs of $9.00
plus expected future liabilities of $33.33, or $42.33. If A follows the standard of 4 units
of care, A faces total costs of only $16. If, however, a is greater than .790 (9.00 + (1 a)(33.33) = 16.00), then A will prefer to be negligent and take less than due care.
See supra note 46.
€ See supra note 46. From table 5 we know that if B takes 1 unit of care, i.e., less
than due care, and A takes 4 units of care, i.e., due care, A faces costs of $16. Also, if A
takes 3 units of care and has no risk of insolvency, she faces $42.33 total costs. A thus
takes due care. If, however, a is gieater than the critical a, .790, A will take less care
than due care.
51 See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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due care, what will A do?
The answer under the simple rule is that at a likelihood of insolvency or absence less than the critical level, A takes due care, while at
likelihoods greater than that level, A takes less care. The answer is the
same under the recovery rule."' The difference between the rules, however, is that under the recovery rule, all else equal, A's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence will be higher than it would be under the
simple rule. That result stems directly from the conclusion that under
the recovery rule A discounts future damages by a lesser amount than
under the simple rule because the recovery rule forces A to pay for B's
share of the damages if B goes insolvent.5" That conclusion is
equivalent to the proposition that for a given amount of discounted future liabilities, A must have a higher likelihood of insolvency under the
recovery rule than under the simple rule before deciding to take less
than due care. The critical likelihood of insolvency or absence must
therefore also be higher under the recovery rule than under the simple
rule."8
The recovery rule is thus relatively more efficient than the simple
rule. The most efficient rule would be one that always encouraged A to
take due care. Neither the recovery nor the simple rule assures that
result. One rule is relatively more efficient than another, however, if it
increases the probability that A will take due care and, if A takes less
than due care, encourages A to take relatively more care. Under the
recovery rule, it is more likely that A will take due care because her
critical likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than under the
simple rule. Moreover, when A takes less care (A's likelihood of insolvency exceeds the critical likelihood) A will take more care under the
recovery rule than under the simple rule. That is so because given any
likelihood of disappearance, A will have greater expected accident costs
under the recovery rule than under the simple rule. 59
56 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.

11 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
" An example is illustrative. We observed, supra note 46, that under the simple
rule, if B takes 1 unit of care less than the standard of due care, A will take 1 unit less
than the standard if A's likelihood of insolvency exceeds the critical level, .790. Suppose
now that the courts follow the recovery rule and that A thinks that B's likelihood of
insolvency is .2. A's critical likelihood of insolvency increases to .825 (9.00 + W/(1 a)(66.67)(1 + .2) = 16.00). Note also that as B's likelihood of insolvency rises, A's
critical likelihood of insolvency rises. For example, if B's likelihood of insolvency or
absence equals .4, then A's critical likelihood of insolvency equals .850 (9.00 + )(1 a)(66.67)(1 + .4) = 16.00).
59 See supra note 46. Suppose a = .85 and P = .2. If A takes 1 unit of care and
B takes 1 unit of care, A faces expected accident costs of $5.00 (1 (1 - .85)(66.67))
under the simple rule and $6.00 (1(1 - .85)(66.67)(1 + .2)) under the recovery rule.
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Strict Liability Rule

1. Traditional Economic Analysis
Landes and Posner conclude that imposing strict liability in joint
tortfeasor accidents is inefficient in the sense that the joint tortfeasors
will not choose to take the efficient due care levels of care.60 They
conclude, therefore, that the negligence rule is superior to the strict liability rule.
The essence of their proof relies on the observation that when one
of the injurers takes care to avoid an accident her expected future accident costs decline and her potential joint tortfeasor's expected accident
costs decline as well. That follows from the assumption that accident
avoidance requires joint care, that is, both injurers' levels of care affect
the likelihood of an accident. Each injurer takes an inefficient level of
care because in deciding how much care to take, each is only concerned
with her costs and will not consider the benefits that her increase in
care confers on the other joint tortfeassor. A takes the level of care that
minimizes the sum of her care and expected accident costs and B does
likewise. But if each took slightly more care, each would be better off
because if A takes more care, B's expected accident costs decline and if
B takes more care, A's expected accident costs decline. But A wouldn't
take more care unless she knew B would as well (and vice versa), and
as we assume that it is prohibitively costly for A and B to negotiate
about what levels of care to take, 1 A and B will not take the efficient,
higher levels of care.6 2
60 Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 542-43.
"1See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
e2 Assume that care, expected accident and total costs are the same as those displayed in tables 2, 3, and 4, supra note 46. Under strict liability, the costs that A and B
face are displayed below in tables 7 and 8.
TABLE 7
A UNDER STRICT LIABILTY RULE
Sum of Care Costs and Expected Accident Costs

TOTAL COSTS TO

($)

B's level
of care, y

1
2
1
101.00
54.00
2
51.00
29.00
3
34.33
20.67
4
26.00
16.50
5
21.00
14.00*
* Minimum cost.
(Source: Tables 2 and 3).

A's level
of care, x
3
42.33
25.67
20.11
17.34
15.67

4
41.00
28.50
24.34
22.25
21.00

5
45.00
35.00
31.67
21.00
29.00
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Economic Analysis of Potentially Insolvent
or Absent Injurers

2.

Consideration of potentially insolvent or absent defendants does
not alter Landes and Posner's conclusion that strict liability is inefficient. In fact, it reveals that the strict liability rule may be even more
inefficient than they conclude. Under a strict liability regime, however,
the recovery rule is still relatively more efficient than the simple rule.
The strict liability rule is inefficient, according to Landes and Posner, because it leads injurers to take too little care.6 If an injurer's
likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than zero, the injurer will
take even less care than the inefficient level she would take without
consideration of that likelihood." That follows from our earlier analyTABLE 8
TOTAL CosTS TO B UNDER STRICT LIABILITY RULE

Sum of Care Costs and Expected Accident Costs

($)

A's level
of care, x

B's level
of care, y

1
2
3

1

2

3

4

5

101.00
58.00
60.34

51.00
33.00
43.67

34.33
24.67
38.11

26.00
20.50
35.34

21.00
18.00*
33.67

72.34
131.67

70.25
130.00

76.50
4
89.00
5
145.00
135.00
* Minimum cost.
(Source: Tables 2 and 3).

69.00
129.00

Importantly, note that the fact that there is a strict liability rule does not change
the efficient levels of care; the cost minimizing levels of care are still where A takes 4
units of care and B takes 2 units of care. The question is, looking at tables 7 and 8, will
A and B take those levels of care? The answer is no. A is best off if she takes 2 units of
care and B takes 5 units of care ($14.00). Suppose A then takes 2 units. B is best off if

she takes 2 units of care and A takes 5 units of care ($18.00). Suppose B then takes 2
units. If both take 2, both are worse off than if the other had taken 5 units (for A,
$29.00 versus $14.00 and for B, $33.00 versus $18.00). In addition, both are worse off
than they would have been had they each taken due care (for A, $29.00 versus $28.50
and for B, $33.00 versus $20.50). Therefore, acting independently, they each take an
inefficiently low level of care.
63 Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 542-43.
" See supra note 46. A and B may no longer be best off if each takes 2 units and
the other takes 5 units. If A's risk of insolvency or absence equals .71, for example, A is
better off if she takes 1 unit and B takes 5 units (6.80 = I + lh(40)(1-.71)) than if she
takes 2 units and B takes 5 units (6.90 = 4 + lA(20)(1 - .71)). Similarly, if B's risk of
insolvency is .31, B is better off if she takes 1 unit and A takes 5 units (14.80 = 1 +
'A(40)(1 - .31)), than if she takes 2 units and A takes 5 units (14.90 = 8 + 1 (20)(1 .31)). Therefore, if A and B are each best off if they take 1 unit and the other takes 5,
and assuming they cannot negotiate between themselves, then they each may take 1
unit. This, of course, is less efficient than if they each took 2 units of care (total social
cost of $202.00 if each takes 1 unit versus total social cost of $62.00 if each takes 2
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sis of single injurer accidents.6 5 Furthermore, our analysis of the effects
of the simple and recovery rules indicates that the recovery rule is more
efficient because it forces injurers to discount expected accident costs by
a lesser amount than the simple rule, and therefore encourages injurers
to take greater care.
IV. CONCLUSION

Four general conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of potentially insolvent or absent injurers. First, the analysis reveals that in
single and multiple injurer accidents a negligence liability rule is more
likely to ensure that potential injurers take efficient levels of 'care to
avoid accidents than a strict liability rule. Importantly, it is not argued
that, overall, a negligence rule ensures relatively more efficient behavior
than a strict liability rule, but simply that a negligence rule better encourages a potential injurer to take efficient levels of care in response to
her likelihood of insolvency or absence. Second, the common law rule
providing that in multiple injurer acccidents the risk of an injurer's
insolvency or absence lies with the other tortfeasors (the recovery rule)
encourages potential injurers to take efficient levels of care. 6 Thus, the
economic analysis complements the courts' and commentators' focus on
victim compensation6 7 and provides an additional, efficiency-based justification for the rule. Third, economic recessions and procedural rules
making it costly for victims to sue injurers increase injurers' likelihoods
of insolvency or absence, thereby encouraging them to take less care to
avoid accidents and so increasing the number of accidents. Fourth, the
analysis shows that negligence and strict liability rules do not operate
as efficiently as traditional law and economic analyses presume.
Finally, the analysis in the Comment is useful in providing insight
into two recent controversies, one involving the market share liability
theory and the other involving the ability of manufacturers to file for
reorganization in response to potential tort liabilities.
The advent of the recent market share liability theory' has raised
units).
See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-4.
67 See supra note 9.
" See Sindell v. Eli Lilly Co., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (adopting market share liability in DES case). Other
courts have rejected the theory. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga.
1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly Co., 526 F. Supp. 587 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly Co.,
514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Dayton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d
171 (1982).
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the question whether victims or injurers should bear the risk of an insolvent or absent injurer's liabilities. While it is unclear whether the
recovery or simple rule will be followed under that new theory, there is
evidence that the recovery rule will prevail. In the path breaking case
of Sindell v. Eli Lilly Co.,69 the California Supreme Court found a
group of manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES)-a drug prescribed
in the 1950's to pregnant women to prevent miscarriages-liable for
the cancer that the drug caused in those women's daughters. The court
held that even though the plaintiff could not identify which drug company manufactured the DES pills that caused her injury, she could
recover if she could show that all of the defendants could have manufactured the pills. Each defendant, moreover, was held liable for a
share of the plaintiff's injuries proportionate to its market share of the
drug at the time the plaintiff purchased the DES.70
The majority opinion in Sindell did not explicitly consider
whether the recovery or simple rule should be followed if one or some
of the drug manufacturers were insolvent by the time of the plaintiff's
suit. The court's majority opinion stated, rather ambiguously, "[ejach
defendant will be liable for the proportion of the judgment presented by
its share of the market. '71 An interpretation of this language consistent
with the simple rule is that each defendant's share of the damages
equals its share of the market. Another interpretation, consistent with
the recovery rule, is that each defendant's share of the market determines the proportions of the plaintiff's recovery that the defendants
must pay, and that the defendants' liability shares may be greater than
their market shares. The dissenting opinion interpreted the majority
opinion to mean the latter,7 2 and bitterly criticized such a rule as unfair. The majority's silence in response to that criticism suggests the
majority's preference for the recovery rule.73 Our analysis of the recovery and simple rules reveals that the recovery rule is more efficient
than the simple rule.
69 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). For commentary on the case, see Fisher, Product LiabilityAn Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Note,
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to DES Causation, 69 CAUF. L. REV. 1179 (1981); Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the

DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv. 668 (1981); Comment, Refining Market
Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 33 STAN. L. REV. 457 (1981); Note,

Proof of Causation in Multiparty Drug Litigation, 56 Tax. L. REv. 125 (1977).
70 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
71 Id.
72

Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148.

73

See also Comment, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14

IND. L. REv. 695, 721 (1981) (agreeing with this interpretation).
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Another example of a recent controversy in the law is the recent
voluntary filing for reorganization of a large asbestos manufacturer in
response to the filing of many tort suits against it for respiratory ailments caused by asbestos."' To the extent that filing for voluntary reorganization' reduces a tortfeasor's liabilities below what they would have
been without the aid of the bankruptcy laws, the ability to file for reorganization reduces a potential tortfeasor's critical likelihood of insolvency and therefore reduces the tortfeasor's incentives to take efficient
levels of care. If those manufacturers were held strictly liable, then the
analysis of single injurer accidents under a strict liability regime indicates that manufacturers' ability to file for reorganization would encourage the manufacturers to take inefficiently low levels of care.
Under a negligence regime the manufacturers would take inefficiently
low levels of care only if the manufacturers' likelihood of insolvency
were higher than the manufacturers' new, lower critical likelihood of
insolvency. A priori it is not clear whether this would occur, but the
ability to receive reorganizational relief makes it a possibility.

" See generally Comment, Relief From Tort Liability Through Reorganization,
131 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1983).

